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# **Peace - Conflict Orientation 2003**

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## **1 Peace and conflict analysis**

The bloody and bitter conflict in Sri Lanka has raged for two decades and has cost the lives of more than sixty thousand people. From the time of the cease-fire and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the country is in a stage of 'negative peace' (absence of violence) and moving towards 'positive peace' (sustainable structures of dealing with conflict). The question is how can this transition be supported and how is it possible to ensure that further conflict lines do not emerge to centre stage or if they do, how they can be transformed into positive conflict.

These conflicts can be identified as follows, between: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), the unresolved position of the Muslims in the east within this process, the president and the prime minister, and the Sinhalese and Tamils in the Hill Country. To date, apart from the GoSL and LTTE, these lines have not been addressed and continue to influence and impact upon all levels of society.

At the current time, the peace process has made commendable and remarkable steps forward. The discussions on the Track I (top-level leadership), through the Thailand Talks, have progressed beyond the three previous cease-fires and there is a general fragile optimism for these discussions. On the side of both the GoSL as well as the LTTE, there has been an admirable restraint shown and a willingness to move forward from the 'hurting stalemate'. However on the Track II (mid-range leadership) and Track III (grassroots leadership), much work remains to be conducted as well as initiated if peace is to become sustainable.

It is important to note that any review of the situation must extend beyond looking at the three communities of Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims to include two cross-cutting segments: youth and civil society.

### **What are local impacts of the national conflict or what are local conflicts in the project area?**

These conflicts are manifested through five core areas: security, communication, grievance and land, youth, structures (returnees & resettlement, location, and other factors). The demographic facts of Trincomalee district are as follows: The population has risen from 256,000 in 1981 to 354,553 in 2001. The ethnic composition for 2001 is: Tamil – 113,376 (32%), Sinhalese – 106,001 (30%), Muslims – 134,376 (38%), other – 1,064 (0.3%). Trincomalee district includes eleven divisional secretaries.

## **Livelihoods in war-affected communities**

There are many factors which make livelihoods in a war-torn environment so vulnerable. People may not rely on a range of resources like physical infrastructure, land, financial services, social networks, human resources, because they are weak or not available within a vulnerability context. The conflict has undermined confidence and trust in the present laws, formal and informal rules and regulations and hence, governance. Limited or restricted access to resources as well the influence of structures and processes result in inadequate livelihood strategies or severe consequences. However, communities develop mechanisms of adjustment and coping in a 'conflict economy'<sup>1</sup>.

Among many outcomes of the conflict one very remarkable consequence is the alarming status of malnutrition. About 80 % of the population in the Northern and East Provinces are estimated to live under the poverty line (basic food basket). The prevalence of chronic malnutrition (28 % in Trincomalee district) and acute malnutrition (27 %) as well as underweight (51 %) is far above the national average and what would be acceptable under WHO and FAO standards.<sup>2</sup>.

## **Security**

Security comprises various components: maintenance of law and order, continuation of conflict strategies, land mines and the movement of peoples. There are large implications concerning the maintenance of law and order resulting from the clashes between the prime minister and the president. This conflict has arisen through various interactions and the main challenge is that the president feels isolated by the prime minister and the Norwegian facilitators.

The recent violent incidents in Muthur (Trincomalee district) and in locations in Ampara, Batticaloa and Jaffna illustrate the challenges of the top-level leadership maintaining on-the-ground control of their peoples. The Muthur incident revolved around the destruction of catholic crosses and the assault in Batticaloa on a three-wheeler driver. From this point, there was a rapid escalation of tension with 'hartal' and counter 'hartal', and a gyrating escalation of violence resulting in damage to places of religious worship as well as the burning of houses. In both incidents, the top-level leadership had lost partial control of the security. This points to the crucial claim that there is no security authority who can guarantee protection to all peoples.

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<sup>1</sup> The IFSP-CATAD project 2001 had surveyed social and economic adjustment pattern of war affected communities. A number of 'work in progress reports' are available, viz. IFSP Working Papers 40 to 44; cf. Conflict - Threat or Opportunity? Land Use and Coping Strategies of War-affected Communities in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, Benedikt Korf et al, Trincomalee and Berlin 2001.

<sup>2</sup> IFSP Working Paper 24, Baseline Survey on Health and Nutrition, Ines Reinhard, Daniela Kraemer Trincomalee, November 1999.

Concerning the continuation of 'conflict strategies', it is still unclear to what extent the extortion of money as well as the abduction of children continues. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) has stated that there is a reduction. The Sri Lankan armed forces (SLAF), too, is preparing for conflict. In recent discussions with military ground personnel, there is a general lack of faith in the peace process and they are simply waiting for its collapse as well as preparing for this scenario.

However, the most pressing matter concerns land mines and their clearance, particularly in the Wanni, in Jaffna and in the east. The presence of land mines is the central challenge in both the utilisation of the land as well as the rebuilding of the agricultural sector and in getting the many internally displaced persons back to their places of origin.

Nevertheless, concerning the peace process, there is a considerable change in the 'atmosphere' within Trincomalee district since the signing of the MoU. It is continually stated, that although restrictions remain, albeit reduced, the general attitude of people has become more open and relaxed. One of the factors that have helped this opening is the reduction in restrictions on the movement of people. This has also had a direct impact on IFSP resulting in quicker progress of village development projects through enhanced local participation and contribution, greater relaxation on the transportation of materials and equipment, as well as being able to be in the field for much longer hours.

### **Communication**

Communications in conflict remain, in themselves, neutral. However, they can be used as a mechanism for incitement as well as restraint; they can be used as a manipulation vehicle for greed or for grievance. To date, the paper media has shown a certain restraint in the conflict and peace process. However, the more government oriented print media provide updated reports and background information with a positive view on actual and potential post-conflict development, whereas the critical press gives a rather negative view.

Other forms of communication such as telecommunications could play a destructive role in spreading rumours and 'calls for help', and the spread of disinformation within the region. As can be seen in both the recent incidents, the speed and rapidity at which the 'news' tore through the community is alarming.

A further impact of the national conflict on the local level is the communication gap between the top-level leadership and their followers. This has an impact not only in the case of security but also in that various sections of the communities do not feel represented at the Track I. This can be seen in Trincomalee district with the Sinhalese who feel that there is no

body or organisation to represent their views. Second, for the Muslims, they too have no place to air their views and desires at the negotiation table.

The final issue of communication is the role of language. Language not only plays a communication role but also it plays a crucial role in identity. A sense of grievance has been expressed by the Tamils towards the Sinhalese that while Sinhalese people speak little Tamil, Tamil people feel obligated to develop basic Sinhala conversation in order to communicate. The public administration continues to communicate predominantly in either Sinhala or Tamil.

### **Grievances and land**

Grievance remains the crux of many issues not only in the agitating factor but also in the clear need for expression and safe spaces for expression. Unless the latter can be attained, there will be continual tensions. This issue will, or rather must be placed centre stage in the continual process towards peace.

Although there are many grievances, a clearly present sense concerns land and is expressed in various forms and can be identified into various clusters. On the issue of land, the Tamils perceive the land as a natural birthright and feel that the Muslims have manipulated the Assistant Government Agent (AGA) to create Muslim dominance. The Sinhalese perceive that they have an inherent right to the land as they have lived there for over three decades and consequently have a right to claim. They feel that there has been ethnic cleansing in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Muslims claim 'cultural ownership' of the land and maintain a distrust towards the Sinhalese as they perceive that the Sinhalese influence has been bolstered. The IFSP-CATAD project 2001 has investigated this issue in detail<sup>3</sup>.

The structure of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and especially Trincomalee district has been determined through previous land policies, resettlement schemes and migration. Over the past three decades there has been a considerable demographic change in the region. The results of this period are clearly visible through illegal settlements, landless people and the forcible evictions of Tamils. There are about seven and a half thousand families to be resettled in Trincomalee district. It remains an open question how many of these families desire to return or whether they would like to stay in their present location.

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<sup>3</sup> IFSP Working Paper 44, Grievances over Land. Dehiwatte – Menkadam: Thematic Area Study on Land Use. K. Devarajah, Benedikt Korf, Christine Schenk, Trincomalee, October 2001

## **Youth**

The role of the youth still remains a critical issue in the Trincomalee district. This is the volatile combination of high unemployment mixed with a radicalisation of various youth sectors. At present, youth from all communities feel dislocated from the peace process and as a result there is little participation in the peace process and a deep-seated frustration<sup>4</sup>.

## **Structure**

The most controversial issue both in the past as well as in present discussions concerns the future status of Trincomalee. It is not only a place of geo-strategic importance with its natural harbour and oil tanks but also a point of extreme contention in the form of the North-Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC). The NEPC originated, in its present merged form, through the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment in 1987 and was finally established in 1988/89. The LTTE eventually opposed the Accord, as they felt grieved at not being consulted and integrated as well as distrust towards the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) through the perception that this was an extension of the GoSL. The Sinhalese people too were deeply divided with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Jamana Vimukti Perumana (JVP) opposing the merger, as they were concerned that this would be the stepping-stone to a divided Sri Lanka. Finally the Muslims feared a reduction of influence in the region and insisted on a referendum.

The structure and power sharing within the NEPC still remains a critical issue. The lack of legitimacy of a bureaucracy which is de facto governing the North-East since 1987 and the absence of elected local authorities has resulted in a different dimension of governance. This has been and will continually be discussed in the peace talks. There is also a call from the Muslims for a separate provincial council as a further merging is seen as disadvantageous. The 'Colombo based' versus 'North-East base' issue remain strong. This can be seen both in terms of perception of peace and conflict as well as discussions over administrations. The controversy over the RRR-Framework (Rehabilitation, Relief, Reconciliation) is a clear example. There is criticism that officials recount, that they are more often called for meeting in Colombo rather than presiding at meetings and ensuring efficiency at the office.

Concerning perception, in the South, the people are already moving forward to the next stages of the peace process, while in Trincomalee district and the region at large, people are still suffering under the tail end of conflict, such as restrictions on fishing, and the movement of ferries – detours.

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<sup>4</sup> Sri Lankan Youth, Challenges and Responses, SAI and FES, Colombo 2002.

Further structural issues are that there are weak cooperation structures between the public and private sectors as well as between NGOs themselves<sup>5</sup>. Since the signing of the MoU, there has been a mushrooming of NGOs in Trincomalee and as in all cases this can be seen both in a positive as well as a negative light. This is determined by the method of implementation which can take the form of 'cash dumping' to highly integrated and specific methods of implementation. A further visible change due to the peace process is the opening of private sector branch offices in Trincomalee.

A final issue that is prevalent is the dual system of administration both in terms of policing as well as justice. In Batticaloa district a second Tamil court has been established and the implications of these dual systems remains to be addressed. At present, there is a transition for the LTTE from a high command and control structure to a broad based political system which includes the establishment of local offices and quasi police stations and own courts in the former so called 'uncleared areas'.

### **How was the conflict analysis done?**

Drawn from K. Rupesinghe, *Human Security in the Eastern Province*, Berghof Foundation 2002 workshops in northern and eastern districts, a workshop with field staff of the IFSP as well as informal talks with the people of Trincomalee, e.g. fishermen, members of the SLAF and Tamil youth (see also Annex) and a review<sup>6</sup> of IFSP Working Papers and Technical Papers were the basis of the conflict analysis.

### **What were the experiences in doing the conflict analysis?**

- Positive method to talk about conflict and mapping out the field of peace building,
- Highly engaged staff with clear reflection upon the current challenges facing their work in relation to past experience and the current peace process,
- Unfulfilled need of the staff's desire to see "what happens now?" – We would recommend a second workshop with the topic "Moving beyond Do No Harm and Peace and Conflict Impact Analysis (PCIA)". This topic could be addressed during the "Do No Harm Workshop 2003".

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<sup>5</sup> IFSP Trincomalee has been engaged in supporting local NGOs with the aim that they re-identify and re-determine their roles and functions in a post-conflict environment. CHA is the facilitating partner; cf TOR for support to NGOs. The IFSP-CATAD project 1999 has extensively analysed the local NGO scene, cf Food Security and Conflict – A Participatory Development Concept for the IFSP Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, Eberhard Bauer et al, Trincomalee and Berlin 1999.

<sup>6</sup> WP 36, Conflict Mitigation through Food Security? WPs 38 to 45, Livelihoods Systems Approach; WPs 28, 32, 34, 47, 50, Coaching Community Mobilisers of IFSP; TP 13, Voiceless Past – Hopeful Future; TP 14, Conflict Analysis; TP 15, Unintended Impacts of Development Aid; IFSP Brief 2001-2002.

## **2 Conflict orientation process 2002 and commitments 2003**

### **2.1 What are past and present activities with a relevance to crisis prevention and conflict transformation?**

IFSP closely cooperates with partner institutions and community based organisations to support livelihoods development in a situation of a complex political emergency since August 1998. The overall goal of IFSP is to improve “the basic need situation, especially food security and nutritional status of the population affected by the conflict in Trincomalee and contributing to a peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the communities”. IFSP and partners have been improving the basic need situation of rural communities. The strategy for implementation incorporates a conflict sensitive approach as well as elements of concepts of conflict transformation. This is a combination of “hardware” (developing the social and production village infrastructure) of the so-called “software” (conflict sensitive approach and conflict transformation, capacity development).

Working in conflict calls for a development oriented participatory approach to allow that potentials and opportunities are addresses, which are identified by the local communities themselves. It is essential to enable communities to actively take part in development efforts without relying on relief. IFSP aims at ‘breaking dependency’. Only then will people be in a position to benefit from post-conflict development, which is slowly taking place in the North and East of Sri Lanka since February 2002.

Community mobilisation is the core strategy to address priorities for village development. Since 1999, IFSP and partners have applied the poverty needs assessment (PNA)<sup>7</sup> with the aim to tackle war affectedness, social deprivation and seasonal food deficit. PNA is the first contact with the village communities. Needs are assessed in dialogue with the local population. Targeting is based on the identification of vulnerable groups and is done by the communities themselves. The livelihood systems approach was further integrated in the conflict sensitisation for staff and stakeholders as well as a tool for conflict analysis in 2001. Together with relevant stakeholders, IFSP reviewed the context of vulnerability, existing resources, defined structures and processes, adjustment and coping strategies, outcomes of resources combination and social-economic behavioural loops.

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<sup>7</sup> TP 6, Field Guide for Participatory Needs Assessment, Benedikt Korf, Trincomalee, October 2000, updated April 2001; the PNA Field Guide is available in English, Sinhala and Tamil and has been made available as standard tool for communication to all government departments, NGOs and certain private sector establishments. The PNA Field Guide was recommended as standard by the provincial and district administration.

### **What was our involvement in the past?**

- ***Contributing to dialogue fora and cooperation with stakeholders:***

From the very beginning IFSP has been communicating with all involved stakeholders. Dialogue fora were created with representatives from government departments, local and foreign NGOs and their apex bodies, UN and international agencies and research institutions and other agencies. IFSP contributed to conferences, seminars and workshops, thereby presenting nutrition and food security as a conflict mitigating concept. Knowledge is shared with stakeholders through intensive documentation.<sup>8</sup>

- ***Dialogue with the conflict parties to ensure transparency of activities and acceptance/support:***

Continuous communication has been practised to create, as far as this was possible, a certain degree of trust and confidence in the mandate and approaches of IFSP. IFSP actively promotes dissemination of knowledge, experience, achievements and constraints for its mandate among the conflict parties as well as among decision makers from government.

- ***Visible and active presence as a neutral, professional institution within an atmosphere of conflict:***

IFSP has been facilitating and, where necessary, actively involved in the implementation of a large number of village development projects and intensive services to improve village and household food security and contribute to livelihoods development. Capacity building has been a focal area.

### **Where are we still involved in present, what is new?**

- Continue contributing to dialogue fora and cooperation with all involved stakeholders,
- Support the re-establishment of social networks and local institutional structures through community mobilisation and investment into the local economy,
- Facilitate integration of livelihoods into local and regional markets,
- Encourage responsible leadership on local level through the cooperation with community-based organisations for better governance,
- Support government institutions to strengthen their outreach of services.

### **What we consider as important, but it is beyond our objectives?**

- Reconciliation work at various levels,
- Reintegration and civilisation of militarised personnel,

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<sup>8</sup> TP 11, Trincomalee Dialogue, Development Aid in a Conflict affected Environment, Trincomalee, May 2001; GTZ Asia Network Conference Nutrition and Food Security in Conflict, Colombo and Trincomalee, March 2001; Participation in RRR working groups; Public lectures; Annual reports, documents and internet site – information system.

- Antagonism between state sector, corporate sector and NGOs continues,
- Imbalanced and critical land use, unclear land titles and increasing encroachment are creating new conflicts,
- Ecological degradation, improper solid waste management and environmental care,
- Unbalanced water use and emerging resource conflicts,
- Political settlement and 'peace dividend' not yet in sight.

## 2.2 Activity plan of the conflict orientation 2003

<b>Conflict factor – <i>Peace initiative</i></b>	<b>Possible contribution of IFSP</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Timing</b>
1. Language barrier - <i>Promotion of multi-lingual communication</i>	Multi-lingual documentation: IFSP news and basic documents (PNA Manual, Mid-day meal concept and drama-theatre performance, livelihoods systems approach, research papers); multi-lingual meetings; promotion of mixed teams; IFSP employs a mixed team: Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims; Support English training courses in cooperation with partners	NEPC and govt. depts, NGOs  EHED, VSO	decision makers, field staff, NGOs and CBOs  youth from all communities	1999-2003  2003
2. Weak cooperation among government institutions, CBOs, NGOs and private sector – <i>Promoting integration</i>	Promoting dialogue as essential part for planning and scheduling work; establishing institutionalised meeting culture; transparency of projects and activities, joint review; information sharing and networking	Manag. of govt. depts., NEPC, multilateral and bilateral organisations, NGOs, research inst., private sector	Govt. depts., reps. from NGOs, researcher, private sector, village communities	1998-2003
3. Dispersed and weak NGOs – <i>Support capacity of Trincomalee based NGOs</i>	Facilitating the re-identification of roles and functions of local NGOs for post-conflict development with emphasis on governance; reducing the antagonism between NGOs and government	Trincomalee NGO Consortium and local NGOs; CHA Colombo	reps. from local NGOs, researchers, decision makers, IFSP staff	2001-2003

<b>Conflict factor – <i>Peace initiative</i></b>	<b>Possible contribution of IFSP</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Timing</b>
4. Objective and/or perceived imbalanced treatment of the three communities – <i>Promoting cooperation within and among communities, and facilitation services</i>	Promote specific criteria for targeting, e.g. apply IFSP vulnerability profile as standard in NEP; promote confidence building through dialogue and improvement of social and production infrastructure; contribute to remove grievances; promote dialogue and opportunities; continue coaching and sensitising IFSP staff and partners	Govt. depts., decision makers, NGOs, village communities	Govt. depts., CBOs, village communities, IFSP staff	1999 – 2003
5. Inadequate adjustment and/or coping strategies of villages comm. – <i>Actively encouraging and promoting economic and social self-help potential</i>	Investment in village infrastructure for emerging market integration and livelihoods base resource combination; community mobilisations as core activity to link to services and market; training and capacity building; Quick impact programme for returning IDPs	Govt. depts., CBOs, local NGOs and action groups, local private sector	Village communities in the district  Returning IDPs	1999-2003  2002 - 2003
6. Weak social network in/of the local communities – <i>Strengthening community based organisations (CBOs)</i>	Promote CBOs as local nuclei for economic development, thereby promoting /strengthening social cohesion through e.g. investment in the production infrastructure and habitat	Govt. dept., CBOs, NGOs, private sector	Village communities	1999-2003
7. Lack of opportunities of youth/educated segment of society – <i>Promotion of development based training and capacity building</i>	Project- and activity-/job-based training, e.g. creation of community mobilisation as 'new' trade; provision of specific opportunities, e.g. follow-up of involvement in IFSP-CATAD projects 1999 and 2001; IT training; HRM	Training inst., development inst., decision makers	Educated youth and young adults; representative s from CBOs, e.g. for CEFE training	1999-2003
8. 'Passivity of communities' – <i>Active encouragement of local contributions for all projects</i>	Clear concepts, criteria and procedures for support; practising 'project book approach'; emphasising economic value of initiatives and assets created; promotion of people centred management of assets; activate entrepreneurial attitude	Govt. depts., projects, e.g. CEFE, private sector, NGOs	Village communities, NGOs, gvt.	1998-2003

<b>Conflict factor – Peace initiative</b>	<b>Possible contribution of IFSP</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>Target group</b>	<b>Timing</b>
9. Conflict on access to and use of water - <i>Promoting social – economically balanced water use</i>	Encouraging demand management and water saving; promote new technologies in irrigation, e.g. SRI system, sprinkler/drip irrigation; promote reuse of water; license wells and restrict overexploitation of aquifer	Govt. depts., environment lobby, researchers, private sector	Decision makers, village communities, private sector	2000-2003
10. Inadequate waste management – <i>Encourage conciseness for environmentally sound waste management</i>	Concept development and action plans based on stakeholder dialogue; testing at local level, e.g. personal and public hygiene, sanitation-human waste, composting, cleaning the village; effect concepts	Govt. dept., special inst., e.g. Environ/Water dept., local govt. agencies, village communities	Population in Trincomalee district	2001 - 2003
11. Insufficient planning capacity and lack of rational decision making for post-conflict development – <i>Database and information systems for the North East (contribution to post-conflict development)</i>	Dialogue with provincial planning department and decision makers on capacity needs; identifying needs that contribute to promotion of governance in post-conflict; supporting short- to medium-term capacity building and networking; support dialogue with stakeholders	NEPC, provincial planning dept., MRRR, JRP, NECORD and other	Planners, middle level executives, third party staff	2002-2003
12. Poor governance – <i>Encourage use of IFSP know-how and capacities for policy decisions: demonstrate what civil society could contribute to peace building</i>	Disseminate livelihoods systems approach and various development oriented concepts/products, e.g. solid waste management, water survey, technical designs, IT and GIS, impact surveys etc.	all relevant partner institutions and projects,	Government depts., NGOs, policy makers, reps. of LTTE, TRO	2002 - 2003

**Remark:** IFSP Trincomalee is presently in a transition phase, which calls for integration into partner institutions and absorption of concepts and approaches by partners. Supporting post-conflict development with a focus on governance and social integration is a main challenge.

### **2.3 Brief outline of the experiences made during the process (pro memoria)**

- Good exercise to review what has been achieved and what needs to be done,
- Review of documents helpful to realise that much has been done and is available to IFASP staff and partners,
- Field visits and dialogue clarify perceptions, thinking and forward views of IFASP staff and partners as well as representatives from village communities,
- Discussion and review with staff and stakeholders: dialogue needs to be continued.

## **Annex**

### **Workshop – IFSP and its Contribution towards Conflict Transformation**

27 November 2002, IFSP – Office II, 9.00 – 11.00

#### **Agenda**

9.00 **Welcome and Introduction**

9.10 **Presentation** – An overview of the field of conflict management and key terms (track I/II/III, peace building, “+” and “-“ conflict/peace)

9.30 **MetaPlan I** – Conflict and Peace Analysis – in relation to Trincomalee district

10.00 **MetaPlan II** – Impact on IFSP – experiences of work in conflict – contributing role of IFSP – ways forward within the framework of the table

10.50 **Wrap-up and Conclusions**

#### **Participants**

A. Austin – Consultant (facilitator)

A. Nimaladas – Engineer

K. Gowriswaran – CM

L. Guanaganeshan – CM

T. C. Emmanuel – CM

T. Murallidaran – CM

D. X. Indrarajan – Engineer

S. Rajruogan – Engineer

S. Thanaraj – Programme Assistant

R. Sivasuthan – CM

C. Schenk – Associate Expert

V. Kandeepan – Junior Expert Health and Nutrition

#### **Minutes**

##### **Cross Level**

More relaxation at all levels and among people in day to day activities

Finding alternative solutions for ex-combatants is an urgent issue

Illegal settlements create new grievances

##### **Track I**

Mutual understanding of political leaders and security officers

Political bankruptcies

Future of oil tanks (former refuelling tank 'farm' of British South-East Asia Fleet), India has interest to take over

Constitution protects one religion

Navy base using American support

Selecting locations for development for IDPs

Selection top-level officers in government system

Fund allocation to institutions

Language awareness among people

Creating job opportunities for youth and villagers

Role of the media

Religious leaders (influence)

Increasing fund requirements for development

Lack of production capacities (development of factories in Trincomalee)

## **Track II**

Conflicting development processes are observed

Attitude change among Sri Lankans towards North and East and overall conflict

## **Track III**

Special criteria for university entrances need to be established

Selection of beneficiaries (IDPs) for development

Presence of new business firms (companies from the centre/south) is observed

Less level of land utilisation due to some risks (mines) hampers re-settlement

Vacating the security points under the MoU

More cultural sensitivity needed

Landless people

Communication rumours spread through modern facilities

Lack of employment opportunities

Using infrastructure e.g. access to vehicles for better outreach

Access to resources not ensured for all

## **IMPACT**

### **Of conflict on IFSP**

Government officers' involvement in IFSP projects and initiatives is good

Colloquial language is practised

Coordination and networking among institutions is the same as before the MoU +/- but has improved vis-à-vis people

Future threat may arise from security forces

More NGO involvement shows positive and negative effects

Security restrictions– delayed the project progress by getting passes – now removed

Free movement and implementation of projects and initiatives is unhindered

More relaxation on material transportation to project sites

More time spending in the field up to 9 p.m. and increase of efficiency

Donor funding approach versus implementing agencies approach is critical – they ‘buy out’

### **Of IFSP on conflict**

More women participation is observed

Translating texts into local languages

Small-scale employment promotion activities are expanding

Youth involvement through action groups

Linking with services is improving

Making easier access through roads constructed by IFSP and others

Facilitating village/group leaders from different communities is possible

Capacity building can be effected more straight forward

Through training changes in attitude and behaviour of staff and partners have occurred

Promoting good of governance through development activities